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T 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
     he issue of how international law can respond to the advent of 
autonomous systems and autonomous cyber capabilities is fraught and 
emotive, especially in the context of warfare, with images of “killer robots” 
on one side and claims that autonomy will further humanitarian ends on the 
other.1 This article explores the intersection of autonomous cyber 
capabilities and two primary rules of international law—that requiring 
respect for the sovereignty of other States and the prohibition on coercive 
intervention into their internal or external affairs. Of all of the rules of 
international law, these are the likeliest to be violated through employment 
of cyber capabilities, whether autonomous or not. This raises the question 
of whether a cyber operation that involves autonomous capabilities presents 
unique issues with respect to the application of the two rules. Are they up to 
the task of governing autonomy in cyberspace? 
 
II. INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS 
 
To address this question, it is first necessary to understand the concept of 
unlawfulness. The legal term for a violation of international law is 
“internationally wrongful act.” According to Article 2 of the Articles on State 
Responsibility, a reliable restatement of the customary law of State 
responsibility prepared by the International Law Commission, “There is an 
internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or 
omission: (a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) 
Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.”2 Both criteria 
must be satisfied for any cyber operation to be unlawful. 
                                                                                                                      
1. Compare HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER 
ROBOTS 1 (2012), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112_ForUplo 
ad.pdf (arguing that autonomous capabilities will result in “killer robots”), with Michael N. 
Schmitt & Jeffrey C. Thurner, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of 
Armed Conflict, 4 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 231, 233 (2013) (concluding that 
banning autonomous weapons would be premature and that this technology may help 
minimize civilian harm). 
2. International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10, at 43 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMMISSION 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter Articles on 
State Responsibility] (emphasis added). On customary international law, see International 
Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its Seventieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/10 
(2018); see also G.A. Res. 73/203, ¶¶ 1, 7 (Jan. 11, 2019) (noting that the General Assembly 
welcomed the International Law Commission’s report, took note of its recommendations, 
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As to the first, there are a number of bases for attributing a cyber 
operation to a State. The clearest example is when an “organ” of the State, 
such as the armed forces, a security service, an intelligence agency, or the 
State’s cyber agency, conducted the cyber operation in question.3 Another 
example of when a cyber operation is attributable to a State under law is 
when an individual or non-State group, such as a hacktivist, terrorist group, 
or private cyber security firm, acts on “the instructions of, or under the 
direction or control of, that State in carrying out” the operation.4 Of course, 
these are just two of the several bases of attribution recognized by the 
International Law Commission.5 
In the absence of attribution, a cyber operation will generally not violate 
international law (although there are limited exceptions, such as violations 
of international criminal law by individuals). For instance, operations 
mounted by patriotic hackers or cyber criminals who are not acting at the 
behest of a State do not qualify as internationally wrongful acts. Even beyond 
this key limitation, the attribution rules can prove challenging. To take one 
example, the type of relationship between a State and a non-State group that 
qualifies as “instructions or direction or control” is somewhat ambiguous 
legally, aside from the fact that evidence of that nexus may not be ironclad. 
In that regard, claims of attribution to a State often provoke debates over 
the requisite standard of evidential sufficiency. 
The fact that a cyber operation involves autonomous capabilities can 
complicate factual attribution, but it does not make attribution more difficult 
as a matter of law. It is the nature of the relationship between the State and 
the individual or group conducting the operation that determines whether 
the attribution criterion for an internationally wrongful act has been satisfied. 
Taking the most straightforward example, a military unit’s cyber operation 
that employs an autonomous capability is attributable to the unit’s State 
irrespective of the consequences of the operation, including whether the unit 
anticipated, or could have reasonably anticipated, those consequences. 
Those are instead issues that bear on the second criterion of an 
internationally wrongful act, breach of a legal obligation owed another State. 
                                                                                                                      
and encouraged the “widest possible dissemination” of the report’s findings on the 
identification of customary international law). 
3. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 2, art. 4. 
4. Id. art. 8. 
5. Other attributable cyber operations could include those conducted by persons or 
entities exercising elements of governmental authority (id. art. 5), organs placed at the 
disposal of a State by another State (id. at art. 6), operations carried out in the absence or 
default of the official authorities (id. art. 9), an insurrectional or other movement that 
becomes the new government (id. art. 10), and conduct that is acknowledged and adopted 
by a State (id. art. 11). 
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For the sake of this article’s analysis, it will be assumed that the use of 
the autonomous cyber capabilities under consideration is attributable to a 
State. Therefore, the remaining analysis will focus on breach of the 
international law obligations requiring respect for the sovereignty of other 
States and prohibiting coercive intervention. 
 
III. AUTONOMY 
 
Before proceeding to those two obligations and the question of whether 
autonomy presents unique challenges to their application in the cyber 
context, it is first necessary to lay the groundwork for analysis by considering 
the concept of autonomy. Unfortunately, discussions of autonomous 
systems are plagued by a cacophony of definitions. For the purposes of this 
article, however, the definitional framework provided by Rain Liivoja, 
Maarja Naagel, and Ann Valjataga works well. 
 
[W]e consider autonomous operation in its simplest sense to refer to the 
ability of a system to perform some task without requiring real-time 
interaction with a human operator. Thus, the way a system performs is not 
decided, in each instance, by a person, but is the result of the design and 
programming of the system and the stimuli that it receives from its 
operational environment. 
. . . . 
[T]his broad definition of autonomy does not mean that an autonomous 
system is by definition one that is completely beyond human control. 
Rather, it means that the manner in which a human interacts with the 
system and exercises control over it differs from a system that is operated 
manually in real time. 
. . . . 
. . . Thus, when we speak in this paper of an autonomous cyber capability, 
we mean a capability that involves the performance of some significant 
function with a significant degree of autonomy. What constitutes 
significant would, however, vary from capability to capability.6 
 
By this approach, different capabilities have different degrees of 
autonomy, ranging from so-called automated to those that are highly 
autonomous, with the common feature being the lack of real-time human 
                                                                                                                      
6. RAIN LIIVOJA, MAARJA NAAGEL & ANN VALJATAGA, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER 
DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, AUTONOMOUS CYBER CAPABILITIES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 10–11 (2019), https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/07/Autonomy-in-
Cyber-Capabilities-under-International-Law_260619-002.pdf. 
 
 
 
Sovereignty, Intervention, and Autonomous Cyber Capabilities Vol. 96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
553 
direction.7 Thus, using common terminology, the autonomous systems 
referred to in this article include most “on the loop” (human monitoring 
and, if necessary, control) and “out of the loop systems” (system operating 
without human involvement), but not those in which the human is “in the 
loop” (human involved in operation of the system). 
In the context of the law surrounding autonomous cyber capabilities, it 
also is useful to distinguish cyber operations that are offensive from ones 
that are defensive. As discussed in this article, the former category comprises 
cyber operations employing autonomous capabilities that are attributable to 
a State, whereas the latter are operations that are a direct response to the 
ongoing or imminent hostile cyber operations of another State. For instance, 
an autonomous capability designed to disable cyber infrastructure that is 
being used to carry out a hostile operation falls into the defensive category, 
whereas the operation to which it responds is offensive in character. A 
borderline case is one in which an autonomous cyber capability is employed 
in response to another State’s hostile cyber operation but the responsive 
action targets cyber infrastructure other than that used to conduct the hostile 
operation. As examined herein, such a response would be encompassed in 
the offensive category, even though its motivation was defensive. 
Defensive cyber operations employing autonomy may be further divided 
into passive and active operations. A passive capability operates within the 
targeted system. Examples are most firewalls and intrusion detection or 
prevention systems. Active defensive measures, by contrast, operate beyond 
the targeted systems, the paradigmatic example being a “hack back.” As will 
be apparent, both the offensive-defensive and passive-active distinctions are 
relevant when assessing whether the use of an autonomous cyber capability 
                                                                                                                      
7. For a survey of this issue, see TIM MCFARLAND, AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS 
AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 29–51 (2020). For U.S. specific military terminology 
and definitions related to autonomy in weapons systems, see U.S. Department of Defense, 
Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapons Systems 13 (2012, Incorporating Change 1, May 
8, 2017), https://www.esd.whs.mil/portals/54/documents/dd/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf. 
Directive 3000.09 defines autonomous weapon system as: 
A weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further 
intervention by a human operator. This includes human-supervised autonomous weapon 
systems that are designed to allow human operators to override operation of the weapon 
system, but can select and engage targets without further human input after activation. 
Id. at 13–14. Further, the Directive defines a human-supervised autonomous weapon 
system as “[a]n autonomous weapon system that is designed to provide human 
operators with the ability to intervene and terminate engagements, including in the 
event of a weapon system failure, before unacceptable levels of damage occur” and a 
semi-autonomous weapon system as “[a] weapon system that, once activated, is 
intended to only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been 
selected by a human operator.” Id. at 14. 
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amounts to an internationally wrongful act in violation of the rules governing 
sovereignty and intervention. It is to those rules that this analysis turns. 
 
IV. SOVEREIGNTY 
 
The existence of a rule of sovereignty in international law was questioned in 
a 2018 speech by then-U.K. Attorney General, Jeremy Wright. 
 
Some have sought to argue for the existence of a cyber specific rule of a 
“violation of territorial sovereignty” in relation to interference in the 
computer networks of another state without its consent. 
 
Sovereignty is of course fundamental to the international rules-based 
system. But I am not persuaded that we can currently extrapolate from that 
general principle a specific rule or additional prohibition for cyber activity 
beyond that of a prohibited intervention. The UK Government’s position 
is therefore that there is no such rule as a matter of current international 
law.8 
 
Under this approach, cyber operations, whether involving autonomous 
capabilities or not, never violate the sovereignty of the State into which they 
are conducted.9 For the United Kingdom, therefore, analysis typically begins 
with an assessment of whether a hostile cyber operation constitutes unlawful 
intervention,10 or even a use of force in violation of U.N. Charter Article 2(4) 
and its customary analogue. 
No other State has publicly taken the same position, although during the 
2020 U.S. Cyber Command conference, the U.S. Department of Defense 
General Counsel expressed a degree of sympathy with elements of the 
                                                                                                                      
8. Jeremy Wright, U.K. Attorney General, Cyber and International Law in the 21st 
Century (May 23, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-inter 
national-law-in-the-21st-century [hereinafter Wright Address]. 
9. See, e.g., Gary P. Corn & Robert Taylor, Sovereignty in the Age of Cyber, 111 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW UNBOUND 207 (2017). But see Michael N. Schmitt & 
Liis Vihul, Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Lex Lata Vel Non?, 111 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW UNBOUND 213 (2017) (arguing that actions that reach a threshold 
degree of infringement on the territorial integrity of another State, as well as those that 
interfere with or usurp inherently governmental functions, necessarily violate the rule of 
sovereignty and are internationally wrongful acts). 
10. See infra Part V. 
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position.11 A number of States, including France,12 the Netherlands,13 Czech 
Republic,14 Austria,15 and Switzerland,16 have taken the opposite position. In 
its 2020 Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations, NATO States did so as 
well, although the United Kingdom issued a reservation on that particular 
element of the doctrine.17 
That sovereignty is a rule of international law applicable in the cyber 
context is the more defensible position, one well-founded in treaty law, State 
practice, and opinio juris, as well as the subsidiary sources of international law, 
decisions of tribunals, and the work of scholars.18 Sovereignty is the rule of 
                                                                                                                      
11. Paul C. Ney, Jr., U.S. Department of Defense General Counsel, DOD General 
Counsel Remarks at U.S. Cyber Command Legal Conference (Mar. 2, 2020), https:// 
www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2099378/dod-general-counsel-
remarks-at-us-cyber-command-legal-conference/ [hereinafter Ney Address]. For a fuller 
discussion, see Michael Schmitt, The Defense Department’s Measured Take on International Law in 
Cyberspace, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69119/the-
defense-departments-measured-take-on-international-law-in-cyberspace/. 
12. MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES, DROIT INTERNATIONAL APPLIQUÉ AUX OPÉRATIONS 
DANS LE CYBERSPACE [MINISTRY OF THE ARMIES, INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO 
CYBERSPACE] 6–7 (2019) (Fr.) [hereinafter FRANCE, MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES]. For an 
analysis of the document, see Michael Schmitt, France’s Major Statement on International Law 
and Cyber: An Assessment, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/ 
66194/frances-major-statement-on-international-law-and-cyber-an-assessment/. 
13. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the Netherlands, Letter to the 
Parliament on the International Legal Order in Cyberspace, Appendix: International Law in 
Cyberspace, at 1–2 (2019), https://www.government.nl/ministries/ministry-of-foreign-
affairs/documents/parliamentary-documents/2019/09/26/letter-to-the-parliament-on-
the-international-legal-order-in-cyberspace [hereinafter Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs]. For an analysis of the letter, see Michael Schmitt, The Netherlands Releases a Tour de 
Force on International Law in Cyberspace: Analysis, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 14, 2019), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/66562/the-netherlands-releases-a-tour-de-force-on-internat 
ional-law-in-cyberspace-analysis/. 
14. Open-Ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security: Second Substantive Session 
(10–14 February 2020), U.N. WEB TV (Feb. 11, 2020), http://webtv.un.org/search/3rd-
meeting-open-ended-working-group-on-developments-in-the-field-of-information-and-
telecommunications-in-the-context-of-international-security-second-substantive-session-
10–14-february-2020/6131646836001/. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. NATO, ALLIED JOINT PUBLICATION-3.20, ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR 
CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS 20 (ed. A, v.1 2020). For an analysis of the publication’s legal 
significance, see Michael N. Schmitt, Noteworthy Releases of International Cyber Law Positions – 
Part I: NATO, ARTICLES OF WAR (Aug. 27, 2020), https://lieber.westpoint.edu/nato-
release-international-cyber-law-positions-part-i/. 
18. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, Respect for Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 95 TEXAS 
LAW REVIEW 1638 (2017). 
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international law most likely to be violated by hostile cyber operations 
attributable to States. The aspect of autonomy changes nothing in this 
regard. 
Sovereignty can be violated based on either territoriality or on 
interference or usurpation of inherently governmental functions. For there 
to be a territorial violation, a cyber operation attributable to a State must 
cause some effect on another State’s territory; it makes no difference 
whether that effect manifests on government or private cyberinfrastructure. 
More to the point, it makes no legal difference whether the requisite effect 
is caused by a system with autonomous capabilities. It is the nature of the 
effect that matters.19 
The unresolved issue is the type of effects that qualify an operation as a 
sovereignty violation. It seems clear that non-de minimis physical damage or 
injury caused in another State’s territory by the use of an autonomous cyber 
capability would do so. Below the threshold of physical damage or injury, 
however, consensus is elusive. The prevailing view appears to be that at least 
a cyber operation resulting in a permanent loss of functionality of the 
targeted cyber infrastructure, or systems that rely upon it, qualifies.20 
Similarly, an operation necessitating either replacement or physical repair of 
that system, as in the case of replacing components, violates sovereignty.21 
Unfortunately, States have been reticent to set forth their legal positions 
as to the threshold for a cyber violation of sovereignty. To date, only France 
has done so with any degree of granularity. In a document issued by its 
Ministry of the Armies, that State took the position that “Any cyberattack 
against French digital systems or any effects produced on French territory 
by digital means by a State organ, a person or an entity exercising elements 
of governmental authority or by a person or persons acting on the 
instructions of or under the direction or control of a State constitutes a 
breach of sovereignty.”22 Although the precise parameters of France’s 
approach remain to be determined, it is an extremely broad approach to 
qualifying cyber operations as violations of sovereignty, one that other States 
may feel uncomfortable adopting, lest it bar their own cyber operations. 
                                                                                                                      
19. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER 
OPERATIONS, r. 4, at 17, and accompanying commentary, at 17–27 (Michael N. Schmitt ed. 
2017) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. 
20. Id. at 20–21; see also FRANCE, MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES, supra note 12, at 7. 
21. For instance, a 2012 hostile cyber operation targeting Saudi Aramco affected 35,000 
computers, necessitating the replacement of affected hard drives. See Jose Pagliery, The Inside 
Story of the Biggest Hack in History, CNN BUSINESS (Aug. 5, 2015), https://money.cnn.com/ 
2015/08/05/technology/aramco-hack/. 
22. FRANCE, MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES, supra note 12, at 7. 
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Returning to the operational typology, a passive cyber defensive measure 
employing autonomous capability will not violate the sovereignty of other 
States since it takes place on the territory of the State conducting it. 
However, both active defensive measures and offensive cyber operations 
involving autonomy raise the prospect of a sovereignty violation. Whether 
sovereignty is violated is a question of law (the threshold for violation) and 
one of fact (the scale and nature of the effects). Autonomy does not alter the 
application of either of these determinations. 
Sovereignty can also be violated when a cyber operation by one State 
interferes with, or usurps, an inherently governmental function of another 
State. Whether this violation can take place outside the territory of the State 
against which the hostile cyber operation is directed remains unsettled in 
international law.23 For instance, it is unclear whether a cyber operation that 
leverages autonomous capabilities to target the Estonian government data 
stored at a data center in Luxembourg, thereby impeding Estonian’s ability 
to carry out its inherently governmental functions, violates Estonian 
sovereignty on this basis. 
In most cases, hostile operations are directed against cyberinfrastructure 
located in a State’s territory. There is a key distinction between violations 
based on interference with or usurpation of an inherently governmental 
function and those based on territorial effects. The former, unlike the latter, 
does not require any type of harm.  The determinative factor is simply 
whether interference or usurpation occurred. This distinction opens the 
door to non-destructive and non-injurious cyber operations employing 
autonomous capabilities, or those that otherwise do not reach the threshold 
of territorial violation, amounting to a sovereignty violation. 
An inherently governmental function may best be understood as a 
function that States alone have the authority to perform (or authorize other 
entities to perform on their behalf). Classic examples include collecting taxes, 
conducting elections, and enforcing laws. For instance, take the case of an 
autonomous cyber capability that searches for systems being used by a 
particular candidate’s campaign and disrupts their use. Irrespective of 
whether the effects on those systems qualify the operation as a breach on 
the basis of territoriality, the fact that the candidate’s campaign has been 
disrupted would amount to interference in the conduct of the election by the 
State concerned. 
Similarly, consider an autonomous cyber capability used by law 
enforcement that activates when it senses criminal activity. Such a cyber 
capability might then attempt to penetrate the criminal infrastructure to 
disable it or gather evidence against the perpetrator. Deploying such law 
                                                                                                                      
23. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 19, at 23. 
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enforcement cyber capabilities into another State’s criminal jurisdiction 
without consent would constitute a violation of the territorial State’s 
sovereignty and would usurp an inherently governmental function. This is 
because only the State from which the purported criminal activity emanated 
enjoys the competency under international law to exercise, or consent to 
another State’s exercise of, law enforcement authority on its territory. That 
the intrusion relied on autonomous capabilities has no bearing on the 
lawfulness of the law enforcement activity. 
As with territoriality, the use of an autonomous passive defense 
capability is unlikely to trigger a violation of another State’s sovereignty on 
the basis of interference with or usurpation of another State’s inherently 
governmental functions because States seldom have a right under 
international law to engage in those functions abroad (except in the 
commons). And as with a violation of sovereignty on the basis of 
territoriality, active cyber defense capabilities and offensive operations, even 
if being employed autonomously, risk violating the law should they interfere 
with or usurp another State’s exclusive right to engage such functions on its 
own territory. 
 
V. INTERVENTION 
 
Unlike sovereignty, the existence of a rule of non-intervention in the cyber 
context is uncontroversial, as illustrated by the U.N. Group of 
Governmental Experts’ confirmation in its 2015 report,24 a position 
subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly.25 Intervention into the 
internal or external affairs of another State is an internationally wrongful act 
in both customary international law and under certain treaties, such as the 
Charter of the Organization of American States.26 The parameters of a treaty 
violation of the rule are to be found in the text of the instruments 
themselves, as well as through interpretation consistent with precepts in the 
                                                                                                                      
24. Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of 
Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (2015), 
transmitted by Letter Dated 26 June 2015 from the Chair of the Group of Governmental 
Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the 
Context of International Security Established Pursuant to Resolution 68/243 (2014) ¶¶ 26, 
27(b), U.N. Doc. A/70/174 (July 22, 2015). 
25. G.A. Res. 70/237, at 2 (Dec. 30, 2015). 
26. Charter of the Organization of American States, art. 15, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 
2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,27 while the following analysis of 
intervention by autonomous cyber means is limited to the customary 
international law rule of non-intervention.28 
In its Nicaragua judgment, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
applying customary international law, observed that intervention consists of 
two elements, both of which must be satisfied for a violation to occur. First, 
the object of the cyber operation must be another State’s internal or external 
affairs, known as the domaine réservé. As, the Court explained, 
 
[T]he principle forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly 
or indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States. A prohibited 
intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters in which each 
State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely. 
One of these is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural 
system, and the formulation of foreign policy.29 
 
In other words, domaine réservé is an area of activity that international law 
leaves for States to regulate, thereby recognizing their discretion to make 
their own choices about such activities. Although the precise contours of the 
domaine réservé are indistinct, certain activities unambiguously fall within its 
ambit. For example, language policy, elections, crisis management, the 
structure of government, and diplomatic activities clearly qualify, thereby 
opening the door to the possibility that using autonomous cyber capabilities 
to affect them, as in the case of disrupting the functioning of a nation’s 
response to a pandemic,30 might run afoul of the non-intervention rule. By 
contrast, matters committed to international law, such as the international 
human rights to expression and privacy online, do not qualify. For instance, 
using autonomous cyber capabilities to disrupt another State’s efforts to 
block lawful online expression would not qualify as a violation of the non-
intervention rule; it might, however, violate the sovereignty of the State 
concerned. 
                                                                                                                      
27. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31–33, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
28. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 19, r. 66, at 312, and accompanying 
commentary, at 312–25. 
29. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgement, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. 
30. See, e.g., Marko Milanovic & Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Attacks and Cyber 
(Mis)information Operations During a Pandemic, JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND 
POLICY (forthcoming 2020) (discussing sovereignty and intervention in the context of a 
global pandemic). 
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Although there is significant overlap with the concept of inherently 
governmental functions in the law of sovereignty, domaine réservé is a broader 
notion.31 Most inherently governmental functions qualify as a domaine réservé, 
but certain domaine réservés are not inherently governmental. An example is 
the provision of tertiary education, which in many States is provided by the 
private sector and thus not inherently governmental. However, it is a domaine 
réservé since international law generally leaves States free to regulate such 
education. Accordingly, an offensive cyber operation involving autonomous 
capabilities that disrupts the functioning of tertiary education would likely 
not violate sovereignty unless it caused the requisite territorial effects but 
could constitute prohibited intervention so long as the second element of 
intervention, coercion, is satisfied.32 
The ICJ discussed coercion in its Nicaragua judgment, stating: 
 
Intervention is wrongful when it uses methods of coercion in regard to 
such choices, which must remain free ones. The element of coercion, 
which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, prohibited 
intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which 
uses force, either in the direct form of military action, or in the indirect 
form of support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another 
State.33 
 
Applying this standard by analogy, using an offensive autonomous cyber 
capability to support insurgents fighting their government would amount to 
a clear case of intervention. The question, though, is in what other 
circumstances is use of an autonomous cyber capability against a domaine 
réservé prohibited by the rule? 
In a 2019 letter to the Parliament on the “International Legal Order 
in Cyberspace,” the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted the 
imprecise definition of coercion, before characterizing the concept of 
coercion as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                      
31. On the relationship between sovereignty and the non-intervention principle, see 
HARRIET MOYNIHAN, CHATHAM HOUSE, THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO 
STATE CYBERATTACKS: SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-INTERVENTION 48–51 (2019), https:// 
www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2019-11-29-Intl-Law-
Cyberattacks.pdf. 
32. However, the analysis must be precise. If universities are engaged in developing 
responses to a pandemic at the behest of or in cooperation with the government, use of an 
autonomous cyber capability could be a violation of sovereignty on the basis that dealing 
with a pandemic is an inherently governmental function. 
33. Nicaragua, supra note 29, ¶ 205. 
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The precise definition of coercion, and thus of unauthorised intervention, 
has not yet fully crystallised in international law. In essence it means 
compelling a state to take a course of action (whether an act or an omission) 
that it would not otherwise voluntarily pursue. The goal of the intervention 
must be to effect change in the behaviour of the target state.34 
 
Restated, an act of coercion is one that deprives another State of choice by 
either causing that State to behave in a way it otherwise would not or to 
refrain from acting in a manner in which it otherwise would act.35 Merely 
influencing the other State’s choice does not suffice; the choice to act or not 
has to effectively be taken off the table in the sense that a reasonable State 
in the same or similar circumstances would no longer consider it to be a 
viable option. 
To illustrate, using autonomous cyber capabilities to spread 
disinformation during an election is a noxious form of influence, but it is not 
necessarily coercive, for voters (the State) retain their ability to decide for 
whom to vote. But using autonomous cyber capabilities to disrupt the 
operation of voting machinery or alter vote counts would certainly be 
coercive because the very ability of members of the electorate to exercise 
political choice has been denied.36 
An often-misunderstood dynamic of the prohibition involves the 
relationship between the coercion and the domaine réservé. The domaine réservé 
is not the physical target of the operation. Rather, it is that area of activity 
that the cyber operation is meant to coerce. Consider a State’s covert cyber 
operation that employs autonomous capabilities in a ransomware attack 
against the sole international port facility of another State. To assess whether 
                                                                                                                      
34. Netherlands, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supra note 13, at 3; Wright Address, supra 
note 8. In his speech, Attorney General Wright observed, “The precise boundaries of this 
principle are the subject of ongoing debate between states, and not just in the context of 
cyber space.” Id.; see also Brian J. Egan, International Law and Stability in Cyberspace, 35 
BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 169, 174–75 (2017) (noting the challenges 
of applying the rule of non-intervention, and sovereignty more generally, to cyberspace 
while serving as U.S. Department of State Legal Adviser). 
35. See DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, AUSTRALIA’S 
INTERNATIONAL CYBER ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY: 2019 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
SUPPLEMENT (2019), https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/international-relations/inter 
national-cyber-engagement-strategy/aices/chapters/2019_international_law_supplement. 
html (defining a prohibited intervention as “one that interferes by coercive means (in the 
sense that they effectively deprive another state of the ability to control, decide, or govern 
matters of an inherently sovereign nature), either directly or indirectly, in matters that a state 
is permitted by the principle of state sovereignty to decide freely”). 
36. See Michael N. Schmitt, “Virtual” Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the Grey 
Zones of International Law, 19 CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (2018) 
(discussing cyber election meddling that would be considered coercive). 
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the operation constitutes unlawful intervention, it is necessary to determine 
why the former is conducting that hostile activity. If it is merely a criminal 
attempt to acquire funds, it is not coercive vis-a-vis any domaine réservé. 
However, if designed to force the State to, for instance, alter its trade practice 
by creating a situation in which there is no choice but to transship through 
the attacker’s logistics network, the relationship between the coercive 
operation and a domaine réservé exists. 
As to the typology of operations, passive defensive cyber operations 
enabled by autonomy will not violate this rule because there is no domaine 
réservé to coerce; States do not enjoy control over a domaine réservé on the 
territory of other States. In most cases, the same is true with regard to active 
defensive cyber operations that employ autonomous capabilities. This is 
because there must be an attempt to deprive the State concerned of its 
exercise of choice over an area of activity that is not committed to 
international law. Since the State conducting the initial hostile cyber 
operation to which the defensive action responds is operating 
extraterritorially, that operation is committed to international law rules 
ranging from the requirement to respect the sovereignty of other States to 
the prohibition on the use of force. It may be that the specific operation 
does not violate any particular rule, but that extraterritorial cyber operations 
into another State’s territory are governed by the general rules of 
international law, a position long accepted by the international community.37 
Of course, offensive cyber operations are subject to the rule of non-
intervention, whether conducted using autonomous capabilities or not. 
Beyond attribution, the only question is whether the elements necessary for 
breach of that primary rule have been satisfied. 
 
VI. INTENT AND MISTAKE OF FACT 
 
The fact that autonomous cyber capabilities operate without human 
involvement, and sometimes without immediate human oversight, raises 
issues of intent and mistake of fact. In this regard, it is necessary to dispense 
with one red herring at the outset. Just because a cyber capability operates 
autonomously does not mean that the State that employs it lacks the intent 
to cause the requisite consequences. Autonomous systems are not 
independent actors in the legal system. Rather, autonomous capabilities are 
                                                                                                                      
37. See, e.g., Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the 
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security 
(2013), transmitted by Letter Dated 7 June 2013 from the Chair of the Group of 
Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security Established Pursuant to 
Resolution 66/24 (2012), ¶¶ 19–20, U.N. Doc. A/68/98 (June 24, 2013). 
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programmed by humans and, more importantly, humans decide to use them. 
So long as that decision is attributable to a State as described above, the use 
of an autonomous cyber capability in no way takes the operation beyond the 
reach of the rules regarding sovereignty and intervention. 
However, that a human may not entirely understand how a system with 
autonomous capabilities might operate, or at least be able to predict the 
consequences of its use, raises an interesting question. If the individual or 
entity deciding to use the capability did not intend the effect that occurred, 
but that effect would otherwise qualify the operation as a violation of either 
the sovereignty or intervention rules, have those rules nevertheless been 
violated? 
Consider a cyber operation that uses autonomous capabilities to map a 
targeted system in another country. The State conducting the operation 
harbors no intention of causing any physical effects that would violate 
sovereignty, and mere cyber espionage is generally not considered to be an 
internationally wrongful act.38 However, during the course of the operation, 
some damage unexpectedly results to the targeted system. Has the State 
conducting the operation breached its obligation to respect the target State’s 
sovereignty? 
Or consider a State’s covert cyber operation employing autonomous 
capabilities to engage in the theft of intellectual property related to the 
development of a vaccine vital to combating an ongoing pandemic. The State 
does not seek to impede the process, but after discovering the breach the 
affected laboratories have to shut down temporarily to assess the integrity of 
research data. As a result, development of the critical vaccine is slowed. Did 
the operation violate the rule of nonintervention because (1) a nation’s 
pandemic response falls within its domaine réservé and (2) the laboratories were 
forced to temporarily interrupt vaccine development? Of course, such 
situations could arise in the case of a cyber operation not employing 
autonomous capabilities, but they would seem more likely to surface should 
autonomy be relied upon. 
The International Law Commission addressed the issues of intent and 
knowledge in its commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility. 
 
Whether there has been a breach of a rule may depend on the intention or 
knowledge of relevant State organs or agents and in that sense may be 
                                                                                                                      
38. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 19, r. 32, at 168; see also Ashley Deeks, An 
International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
291, 300–13 (2015). But see Inaki Navarrete & Russell Buchan, Out of the Legal Wilderness: 
Peacetime Espionage, International Law and the Existence of Customary Exceptions, 51 CORNELL 
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 897 (2019); RUSSELL BUCHAN, CYBER ESPIONAGE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2018). 
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“subjective”. For example, article II of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide states that: “In the present 
Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such …” In other cases, the standard for breach of an obligation 
may be “objective”, in the sense that the advertence or otherwise of 
relevant State organs or agents may be irrelevant. Whether responsibility is 
“objective” or “subjective” in this sense depends on the circumstances, 
including the content of the primary obligation in question. The articles lay 
down no general rule in that regard. The same is true of other standards, 
whether they involve some degree of fault, culpability, negligence or want 
of due diligence. Such standards vary from one context to another for 
reasons which essentially relate to the object and purpose of the treaty 
provision or other rule giving rise to the primary obligation. Nor do the 
articles lay down any presumption in this regard as between the different 
possible standards. Establishing these is a matter for the interpretation and 
application of the primary rules engaged in the given case.39 
 
In other words, the role of intent turns on whether it is an element of 
the breach in question. On the one hand, if it is, as is textually the case with 
genocide and other rules of international criminal law, the absence of intent 
will preclude a cyber operation that involves autonomous cyber capabilities 
from amounting to either an internationally wrongful act by the State 
concerned or an act generating individual criminal responsibility. 
Importantly though, the commentary acknowledges that intent can be a 
condition precedent to the breach of a primary rule in which the requirement 
is not clear on its face. Thus, in cases of an implicit intent requirement, no 
breach will lie absent intent. 
On the other hand, the absence of an express or implied intent 
requirement raises the possibility of breach even if the consequences that 
manifested were unforeseen and unforeseeable. Accordingly, the role of 
intent in assessing whether a cyber operation employing autonomous 
capabilities violates international law depends on the presence or absence of 
a mens rea element in the individual primary rules. 
However, a degree of caution is merited. As Marko Milanovic has noted, 
certain rules and regimes of international law have developed bespoke 
standards with respect to mistakes of fact. For instance, he notes that in 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law an 
“honest and reasonable” mistake as to the facts can exonerate the State 
                                                                                                                      
39. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 2, art. 2, commentary ¶ 3, at 34–35. 
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concerned.40 This begs the question of whether a similar mistake of fact 
standard should apply in the case of other rules of international law like 
sovereignty and intervention. 
To illustrate, consider a State A cyber countermeasure41 involving 
autonomous capabilities mounted against State B that bleeds over into State 
C. The result is a permanent loss of functionality of affected cyber 
infrastructure in State C, a violation of that State’s sovereignty. If State A 
should have known (constructive knowledge) that bleed over would occur, 
it has violated State C’s sovereignty even though the operation’s qualification 
as a countermeasure precluded its wrongfulness as to State B. The belief that 
there would be no bleed over was not reasonable. But if the belief was 
reasonable, should that fact excuse the violation of State C’s sovereignty? 
The experts who drafted Tallinn Manual 2.0 concluded that a reasonable 
mistake of fact as to the need to use force in self-defense against another 
State would excuse that use of force.42 As Milanovic notes, there is a degree 
of State practice supporting this position.43 Yet the ICJ seemed to come to a 
contrary conclusion in its Oil Platforms judgment.44 And in the context of 
countermeasures, the International Law Commission, in its commentary to 
the Articles on State Responsibility, opined that, 
 
A State taking countermeasures acts at its peril, if its view of the question 
of wrongfulness turns out not to be well founded. A State which resorts to 
countermeasures based on its unilateral assessment of the situation does so 
at its own risk and may incur responsibility for its own wrongful conduct 
in the event of an incorrect assessment. In this respect, there is no 
difference between countermeasures and other circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness.45 
 
A majority of the experts who authored Tallinn Manual 2.0 took the same 
position. In doing so, they “emphasised the desirability of preventing a 
proliferation of countermeasures and the fact that countermeasures, despite 
being designed to resume lawful relations between the States concerned, 
                                                                                                                      
40. Marko Milanovic, Mistakes of Fact When Using Lethal Force in International Law: Part I, 
EJIL:TALK! (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/mistakes-of-fact-when-using-lethal-
force-in-international-law-part-i/. 
41. See infra Section VII.A. 
42. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 19, at 347. 
43. Marko Milanovic, Mistakes of Fact When Using Lethal Force in International Law: Part II, 
EJIL:TALK! (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/mistakes-of-fact-when-using-lethal-
force-in-international-law-part-ii/. 
44. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161, ¶ 73 (Nov. 6). 
45. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 2, commentary to art. 49, at 130–31. 
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nevertheless present a risk of escalation.”46 The experts distinguished this 
position from their view with respect to a mistake of fact in the context of 
self-defense on the basis that States should be afforded a wide degree of 
discretion to act when the consequences of a failure to do so can be 
extremely serious, as is the case with respect to a failure to respond to an 
armed attack. 
But that conclusion was not unanimous. Some experts contended that 
an honest and reasonable mistake of fact should operate to leave the 
countermeasure’s preclusion of wrongfulness intact.47 In their view, States 
must be empowered to defend themselves against hostile cyber operations, 
whether those operations are at the level of an armed attack entitling the 
victim State to act in self-defense or an internationally wrongful act below 
that level that opens the door to countermeasures. 
As is apparent, the law surrounding the mistake of fact doctrine, beyond 
discreet bodies of law in which such a doctrine clearly applies, remains 
unsettled. This is certainly the case with respect to both sovereignty and 
intervention. The sounder legal position is that it does not excuse a violation 
of international law unless it negates intent with regard to a primary rule of 
international law requiring intent as a condition of violation. Otherwise, the 
State that was the victim of the mistake of fact would have to suffer the 
consequences of that mistake without the possibility of securing reparations, 
which are only due in the face of an internationally wrongful act.48 By 
rejecting the applicability of a mistake of fact doctrine, the costs of a mistake 
of fact are appropriately shouldered by a State making it, not the victim of 
that mistake. 
Since intent is not a required element of the breach of the obligation to 
respect the sovereignty of another State, a cyber operation using 
autonomous capability that causes unintended qualifying effects would 
violate international law. As to the unsettled question of whether a mistake 
of fact doctrine might excuse a sovereignty violation, States are likely to 
reject its applicability for the aforementioned reason, particularly as 
autonomous, and especially artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities become 
common. After all, the less control a State exercises over the conduct of an 
operation, the more logical it is that the State bears the risk of its mistake 
and the less appropriate it is that victim States should be left less than whole. 
By contrast, intent is an implied requirement for the internationally 
wrongful act of intervention into the internal or external affairs of another 
State. Recall that there must be a relationship between coercion and the 
                                                                                                                      
46. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 19, at 116. 
47. Id. 
48. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 2, art. 31. 
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domaine réservé; the State conducting the operation has to seek to deprive the 
target State of choice with respect to its behavior or policies involving a 
domaine réservé. Therefore, absent intent to do so, there would be no violation 
of this prohibition if an autonomous cyber capability caused unexpected 
harm that in fact deprived the affected State of choice. 
To take a simple example, consider a case in which a State uses 
autonomous passive cyber defences to enhance the security of cyber systems 
on its territory. An insurgent group in another State has been using a social 
media platform operated from the former for command, control, and 
communications (C3) in hostilities with the government. The autonomous 
passive defensive measures significantly improve the security of social media, 
thereby contributing to the security of the insurgent group’s C3. In that there 
was no intent to enhance the insurgent group’s operational capabilities, there 
is no intervention. 
 
VII. CIRCUMSTANCES PRECLUDING WRONGFULNESS 
 
Even though certain cyber operations employing autonomous capabilities 
might breach either the obligation to respect the sovereignty of other States 
or the prohibition on intervention into the internal or external affairs of 
those States, international law sets forth a number of circumstances in which 
international law nevertheless would not be violated. These so-called 
“circumstances precluding wrongfulness” include consent, self-defense, 
qualification of the action as a countermeasure, force majeure, distress, and 
necessity.49 The most significant in the context of autonomy are 
countermeasures, necessity, and self-defense; the analysis that follows 
focuses on these three circumstances. 
 
A. Countermeasures 
 
A countermeasure is an “act” (either an action or an omission) that would 
be unlawful but for the fact that it is designed to put an end to another State’s 
(the “responsible State”) operation that is breaching an obligation owed the 
former (the “injured State”).50 Nothing bars application of this circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness to cyber operations that involve autonomous 
capabilities. 
                                                                                                                      
49. Id. arts. 20–25. 
50. See TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 19, rr. 20–25, at 111–34; see also Michael N. 
Schmitt, “Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The Countermeasures Response Option and 
International Law, 54 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 697 (2014). 
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As an example, this basis for precluding wrongfulness of an act could 
allow for active defense, such as an autonomously conducted hack-back or 
a human launched hack-back involving autonomous capabilities. It could 
also take the form of an offensive operation employing autonomous 
capabilities against systems other than those used to conduct the unlawful 
cyber operation if the objective is to compel the responsible State to desist. 
This is because a countermeasure need not be directed at the entity 
conducting the unlawful cyber operation or the cyberinfrastructure from 
which it originated. For instance, a cyber countermeasure might leverage 
autonomous capabilities to target vulnerable government or private 
cyberinfrastructure having nothing to do with the cyber operation to which 
the injured State is responding. A countermeasure need not even be in-kind; 
a cyber operation involving autonomous capability may be used in response 
to a non-cyber internationally wrongful act, as in the case of providing 
funding or arms to an insurgent group fighting the government.51 The key 
limitation on countermeasures is instead that they may only be intended to 
either put an end to an ongoing unlawful action or to secure reparations for 
one that has been completed, or both; countermeasures may not, however, 
be motivated by a desire to punish or retaliate.52 
The prospect of employing an autonomous capability as a 
countermeasure raises three issues. First, countermeasures must be 
proportionate. Proportionality is understood in the countermeasures context 
as meaning “commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the 
gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question.”53 In 
practical terms, the negative effects of the countermeasure for the 
responsible State may not be excessive relative to the harm the injured State 
is suffering. If the autonomous capability causes excessive harm, the State 
taking the purported countermeasure will have itself violated international 
law. In this regard, recall that the absence of intent or a mistake of fact often 
will not excuse the injured State’s violation even if the nature and extent of 
harm caused were unforeseen and unforeseeable. In most cases, a 
disproportionate countermeasure will violate the responsible State’s 
sovereignty, but other violations might also occur. 
Second, the Articles on State Responsibility provide that “[b]efore taking 
countermeasures, an injured State shall call upon the responsible State . . . to 
fulfil its obligations [to cease the operation and offer any appropriate 
                                                                                                                      
51. Such actions qualify as intervention. See e.g., Nicaragua, supra note 29, ¶ 242. 
52. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 2, art. 49(1). 
53. Id. art. 51. 
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assurances, guarantees and reparations.54 Further, the injured State must 
“notify the responsible State of any decision to take countermeasures and 
offer to negotiate with that State.”55 An absolute notification requirement 
would not necessarily preclude the post-notice launch of a cyber 
countermeasure involving autonomous capabilities, but it would bar using 
autonomous capabilities to launch an automatic response to an incoming 
hostile cyber operation. 
The commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility acknowledges 
that there may be certain situations requiring “urgent countermeasures” to 
preserve an injured State’s rights.56 States that have spoken to the issue have 
taken a strong stance against a notice requirement in situations in which 
notice might diminish the countermeasure’s likelihood of success, for 
instance by allowing the responsible State to take measures in anticipation 
of the action57 or because providing notice could reveal sensitive 
capabilities.58 This does not necessarily mean that an automatic hack-back 
relying upon autonomous capabilities or a no-notice countermeasure 
involving autonomy would never run afoul of the purported notice 
requirement. But it does open the door to no-notice countermeasures so 
long as the State employing the autonomous capability can make a cogent 
argument that it was necessary to act without notice, as might be the case 
with hostile operations against critical infrastructure that can only be 
defeated by exploiting a zero day vulnerability in the responsible State’s 
systems. 
Third, countermeasures are only available in response to internationally 
wrongful acts that are attributable to States.59 Therefore, to be lawful there 
would have to be a relatively high degree of certainty that a particular State 
was behind the hostile cyber operation if autonomous capabilities were used 
to determine whether to launch the countermeasure response or the 
countermeasure response itself involved autonomous capabilities. This is an 
important limitation in light of the view expressed above that a mistake of 
                                                                                                                      
54. Id. arts. 30–31. 
55. Id. art. 52. 
56. Id. art. 52, commentary ¶ 1, at 135. 
57. FRANCE, MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES, supra note 12, at 8; Netherlands, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, supra note 13, at 7; Ney Address, supra note 11. 
58. Wright Address, supra note 8. 
59. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 2, art. 22. Note that a countermeasure 
directed at a non-State actor conducting hostile cyber operations might be appropriate if 
the State from which the operation being mounted is in breach of its due diligence 
obligation. See Michael N. Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence, 124 YALE LAW JOURNAL 
FORUM 68, 79–80 (2015), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/in-defense-of-due-dili 
gence-in-cyberspace. 
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fact does not excuse an internationally wrongful act unless provided for in 
the body of law or primary rule in question, which is not the case with 
sovereignty or intervention. Indeed, recall that both the International Law 
Commission and a majority of the Tallinn Manual 2.0 experts were of the 
view that countermeasures are taken at the injured State’s risk.60 
 
B. Necessity 
 
A second basis upon which the wrongfulness of a cyber operation utilizing 
autonomous capability is precluded is in a circumstance of necessity. As 
noted in the Articles on State Responsibility, a cyber operation is “necessary” 
when it is “the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against 
a grave and imminent peril” and the act “does not seriously impair an 
essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, 
or of the international community as a whole.”61 
This circumstance precluding wrongfulness is especially important, for 
there is no requirement that the hostile cyber operation to which the cyber 
operation responds be attributable to a State, or even that the initiator of the 
operation be known. Moreover, the hostile cyber operation to which the 
State responds in necessity need not be an internationally wrongful act. Most 
importantly, a State’s cyber operation conducted on the basis of necessity is 
lawful even though it may breach an obligation such as sovereignty that is 
owed another State that bears no responsibility whatsoever for the situation, 
as long as doing so does not seriously affect the latter’s essential interests. 
This makes the possibility of bleed over caused by an autonomous capability 
less likely to result in a violation of international law. Thus, necessity fills key 
gaps left by these requirements in the context of countermeasures.62 
As with countermeasures, there may be practical issues with respect to 
using autonomous capabilities in situations of necessity, both when they 
contribute to determining whether to launch a response (perhaps without 
human involvement), and as to those that form part of the cyber response. 
With respect to the former, the autonomous capability would have to discern 
if an essential interest of the State is at stake and determine whether the 
negative impact on that interest is grave. Part of the challenge is that neither 
“essential interest” nor “grave and imminent peril” are well-defined in 
international law. 
                                                                                                                      
60. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
61. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 2, art. 25(1); see generally TALLINN 
MANUAL 2.0, supra note 19, r. 26, at 135, and accompanying commentary, at 135–42. 
62. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 2, commentary to art. 25. 
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In this regard, policymakers and scholars often speak in terms of hostile 
cyber operations against critical infrastructure as triggering necessity. 
However, it is not the infrastructure that must be essential, but rather the 
interest that an operation against the infrastructure will affect that must 
qualify as essential. Moreover, the notion of critical infrastructure is relative; 
one State’s critical infrastructure may not be another’s because State’s have 
differing needs. And even if it can be agreed that certain cyber infrastructure 
is of a nature that an operation conducted against it will always affect an 
essential interest, as in the case of nuclear facilities, a cyber operation 
targeting that infrastructure might not gravely affect the interest. Thus, while 
there could be circumstances in which the employment of autonomous 
capabilities on the basis of necessity is lawful, the capability would have to 
be programmed very carefully to ensure it comports with necessity’s 
demanding criteria. 
Finally, the requirement that a cyber operation mounted on the basis of 
necessity not place the essential interests of other States in grave and 
imminent peril presents a significant obstacle if autonomous capabilities are 
used. Should the response cause an effect at that level, the fact that the State 
did not anticipate those consequences, a possibility that is likely exacerbated 
by autonomous capabilities, would not shield it from responsibility for 
violations of international law, in particular sovereignty, involving those 
effects. 
 
C. Self-Defense 
 
A third circumstance precluding wrongfulness is self-defense pursuant to 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and customary international law.63 That article 
provides, in relevant part, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council 
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”64 
Although self-defense as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness is usually 
discussed in the context of the prohibition on the use of force found in 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and customary international law, most uses 
of force also violate the sovereignty of the State into which they are 
conducted and, as noted by the ICJ in its Nicaragua judgment, the rule of 
                                                                                                                      
63. Id. art. 21; see generally TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 19, rr. 71–75 and 
accompanying commentary, at 339–56. 
64. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
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non-intervention.65 Thus, if a cyber operation involving autonomous 
capability qualifies as an act of self-defense, neither of those rules is violated. 
In that preclusion of wrongfulness under self-defense envisions a use of 
force, strict criteria govern its applicability. Most important, self-defense is 
only available when the operation to which it responds is at the level of an 
“armed attack.”66 That threshold is somewhat ambiguous in the non-cyber 
context but much more so with respect to hostile cyber operations.67 Cyber 
operations involving autonomous capabilities that result in significant 
human injury or physical damage clearly qualify, but below that kinetic 
threshold there is a lack of international consensus.68 
The most robust position taken to date is that of the French Ministry of 
the Armies, which announced in 2019 that: 
 
[a] cyberattack could be categorised as an armed attack if it caused 
substantial loss of life or considerable physical or economic damage. That 
would be the case of an operation in cyberspace that caused a failure of 
critical infrastructure with significant consequences or consequences liable 
to paralyse whole swathes of the country’s activity, trigger technological or 
ecological disasters and claim numerous victims.69 
 
                                                                                                                      
65. Nicaragua, supra note 29, ¶ 205. 
66. See U.N. Charter art. 51. 
67. Michael N. Schmitt, The Use of Cyber Force and International Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1110, 1119–29 (Marc Weller 
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carried out by a state. 
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publications/international-relations/international-cyber-engagement-strategy/aices/chap 
ters/annexes.html (“In determining whether a cyber attack, or any other cyber activity, 
constitutes a use of force, states should consider whether the activity’s scale and effects are 
comparable to traditional kinetic operations that rise to the level of use of force under 
international law.”). 
69. FRANCE, MINISTÈRE DES ARMÉES, supra note 12, at 8. 
 
 
 
Sovereignty, Intervention, and Autonomous Cyber Capabilities Vol. 96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
573 
Since the French position has not yet been publicly embraced by other 
States, most of whom have remained silent on the matter, the threshold at 
which self-defense will preclude the wrongfulness of a cyber operation 
involving autonomous capabilities remains uncertain. 
This being so, States resorting to autonomous capabilities must be alert 
lest they inadvertently respond in self-defense to a cyber operation that falls 
short of the armed attack threshold, wherever it might lie. This prospect is 
particularly problematic because while it is uncertain whether a mistake of 
fact excuses a mistaken use of cyber force in self-defense, there is no 
question that it does not excuse a mistake of the law, such as an error 
regarding the threshold for breach. And even though the threshold of harm 
necessary to trigger the right of self-defense is ambiguous, a State operating 
in the grey zone of normative uncertainty always risks the condemnation of 
other States. That autonomous capabilities might generate results that are 
somewhat less predictable than cyber operations not employing such 
capabilities only increases this risk. 
Two additional uncertainties in the law of self-defense further 
complicate cyber operations involving autonomous capabilities. First, there 
is a longstanding debate as to whether States are entitled to resort to self-
defense in the face of hostile operations at the armed attack level that were 
neither mounted by another State nor, in the words of the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua judgment, conducted “by or on behalf,” or with the “substantial 
involvement” of, another State.70 Although the better view is that the right 
of self-defense applies to armed attacks by non-State actors,71 the ICJ has on 
two occasions confirmed the restrictive position it took in Nicaragua.72 
Should that approach prevail as a matter of law, those employing an 
autonomous capability, or the autonomous capability itself, would need to 
have the capacity to distinguish operations satisfying the conditions set forth 
by the Court from those that do not. 
Second, this uncertainty relates directly to the “unwilling-unable” 
debate.73 Assuming for the sake of analysis that self-defense is available 
against non-State actors, consider a case in which non-State actors are 
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operating from the territory of another State without the involvement of that 
State. May the victim State conduct cyber operations involving autonomous 
capabilities into the territorial State against the non-State actor without 
violating the territorial State’s sovereignty or the rule of non-intervention? 
It may not do so on the basis of countermeasures because they are 
unavailable in response to the operations of non-State actors, cyber or 
otherwise, that are not attributable to a State. Should the non-State actor’s 
operations not affect an essential interest of the victim State in a grave and 
imminent manner neither would there be any basis to conduct the operation 
pursuant to necessity. And if cyber operations involving autonomous 
capability at the use of force level are needed to address the situation, neither 
countermeasures nor necessity allow for the use of force.74 This leaves only 
self-defense as a possible circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of the 
cyber response to the non-State actor attacks. 
There is substantial disagreement over whether self-defense may 
preclude the wrongfulness of the violation of sovereignty that would occur 
should the operation involving autonomy be launched on that basis into a 
State to which the operation cannot be attributed. Some are of the view that 
it cannot—that sovereignty is a veil pierceable only when the State 
concerned is considered under international law to have directly or indirectly 
launched the armed attack.75 However, numerous States hold a less 
restrictive view, espousing the right of self-defense against a non-State actor 
in the territory of another State when the territorial State is either “unable or 
unwilling” to put an end to the hostile operations from its territory.76 In light 
of this debate, States employing autonomous cyber capabilities into other 
States against non-State actors under a theory of self-defense run the risk of 
some States and scholars characterizing their operations as breaches of 
sovereignty, unlawful, intervention, and, perhaps, unlawful uses of force. 
Finally, any use of an autonomous cyber capability on the basis of self-
defense must comply with the requirements of necessity and proportionality 
that have been recognized by the ICJ and are uniformly accepted across the 
international community.77 In the context of self-defense, necessity denotes 
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the requirement that there be no non-forcible means of dealing with the 
situation effectively, while proportionality refers to the requirement that no 
more force, cyber or non-cyber, be used than that which is required to end 
the armed attack. Defensive responses at the use of force level that employ 
autonomous capabilities, and the autonomous capabilities themselves, must 
be capable of making such calculations if self-defense is to operate as a 
circumstance precluding wrongfulness. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
It seems to be de rigueur in international law circles to approach new 
technologies with grave concern. The rebuttable presumption seems to be 
that international law will fall short in adequately governing them. That was 
certainly the case with cyber operations. At the time the original Tallinn 
Manual project was launched in 2009, claims that cyberspace was a 
normative Wild West were frequent, and very much in vogue.78 Yet, by the 
time of its publication in 2017, Tallinn Manual 2.0, drawing upon a diverse 
group of international law experts from around the world, had identified 154 
consensus rules and agreed upon nearly 600 pages of commentary.79 
This does not mean that there are no remaining challenges in the 
interpretation and application of the extant international law in the cyber 
context. Nevertheless, States are making significant progress in assessing 
how international law governs cyberspace, as illustrated by the work of the 
multiple U.N. Groups of Governmental Experts, the proceedings of the 
U.N. Open-Ended Working Group, and the number of statements on the 
subject that have been issued in the last two years.80 
To some extent, autonomy and international law suffer the same 
dynamic. Initially, attention centered on lethal autonomous weapons 
systems, with battle lines drawn between those who would outlaw the 
systems and those who argued international humanitarian law suffices to 
govern them, primarily through the interpretive process that occurs with all 
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new technologies of war.81 Discussion of autonomy and international law 
beyond the topic of warfare has only just begun. 
It would appear, however, that as with many other nascent technologies, 
at least with respect to the international law rules requiring respect for the 
sovereignty of other States and prohibiting intervention into their internal or 
external affairs, autonomy presents few challenges. Indeed, the normative 
architecture appears quite sound. While there are numerous unsettled issues 
surrounding application of these two primary rules to cyber operations, the 
fact that a cyber operation employs autonomous capability has little legal 
bearing on their resolution. Rather, autonomy simply makes it more difficult, 
at least at times, to confidently apply the rules because of uncertainty as to 
the consequences. Yet, these are dilemmas of fact, not law, and must be 
understood and acknowledged as such. 
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